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I. Introduction 
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) selected the winning design from the two nuclear 
weapons laboratories for the reliable replacement warhead (RRW) on March 2, 2007. The winning design 
by the Lawrence–Livermore National Laboratory was the more cautious design, and had been tested 
previously. The Los Alamos design was more creative, but had not been nuclear tested. With the Cold 
War over, NNSA is planning to make warheads that are less constrained in weight and, in principle, more 
reliable. The Congress and the Executive Branch have agreed that RRW will not be tested before it enters 
the stockpile. Of course, this does not guarantee that the decision not to test could not be reversed in the 
future. The JASON group will comment on the RRW designs during the next year and the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science will release its report on the RRW in March 2007. Our 
discussion is intended as background material to help understand the RRW decisions and reports. On 
March 6, a session at the Denver APS meeting considered the RRW and nuclear missions. Talks were 
given by John Harvey (Director of NNSA Policy and Planning), Lt. General C. Robert Kehler (Deputy 
Commander of STRATCOM), Bruce Tarter (Chair of the AAAS–RRW Study), Sidney Drell (Stanford), 
Ivan Oelrich (Federation of American Scientists). The need for the RRW has been called into doubt by 
the 2006 JASON report that concluded the following: [1] 
“Most primary types have credible minimum lifetimes in excess of 100 years as regards aging of 
plutonium; those with assessed minimum lifetime of 100 years or less have clear mitigation paths that are 
proposed and/or being implemented...There is no evidence for void swelling in naturally –Pu samples 
over the actual and acceleratedδaged or artificially aged  times scales examined to date, and good reason 
to believe it will not occur on times scales of interest, if at all. Systems with large margins will remain so 
far greater than 100 years with respect to Pu aging. Thus, the issue of Pu aging is secondary to the issue of 
managing margins.”  
There is a strong consensus in the US that the primary mission of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear 
attacks by other nations. However, there is also a strong consensus that nuclear weapons do not deter 
terrorism by non-state actors. These views were summarized by former Secretaries of State George Shultz 
and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Chair of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee Sam Nunn and others, who commented in the Wall Street Journal of 4 January 2007 
that “reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose [deterrence] is becoming increasing hazardous and 
decreasingly effective.”[2] They also recommended ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) by “Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase 
confidence and provide periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.” 
The main technical issue that blocked CTBT ratification in 1999 was the following: “Will nuclear 
weapons be sufficiently reliable if they are not tested for centuries?” This question is somewhat 
misleading since a nation can always withdraw from the CTBT under Article IX when its “supreme 
interests” are jeopardized. The other main CTBT issues have been or are being solved sufficiently for 
ratification by the Senate: 
(1) CTBT Effective Verification. The CTBT will be “effectively verifiable” when the International 
Monitoring System is complete and because regional seismic monitoring has greatly improved, along 
with improvements with seismic arrays and analysis, interferometric synthetic aperture radar and 
cooperative monitoring. The level at which cheating could take place would not significantly threaten US 
national security, according to the Nitze–Baker criteria used for the INF and START I-II treaties.[3] The 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 2002 study on the CTBT concluded the following on monitoring 
with a fully deployed primary seismic network:[4] 
Underground explosions can be detected and can be identified as explosions, using IMS data, down to a 
yield of 0.1 kt [tamped] in hard rock if conducted anywhere in Europe Asia, North America and North 
Africa. In some locations of interest, such as Novaya Zemlya, this capability extends down to 0.01 kt or 
less. 
(2) CTBT (with–compliance) vs. no–CTBT vs. CTBT (with–evasion). The NAS panel 
examined these three situations for seven nations ( Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iraq and 
Iran), concluding the following:[5] 
States with extensive prior test experience [Russia and China] are the ones most likely to be able to get 
away with any substantial degree of clandestine testing, and they are also the ones most able to benefit 
technically from clandestine testing under the severe constrains that the monitoring system will 
impose….Countries with lesser prior test experience and/or design sophistication would also lack the 
sophisticated test–related expertise to extract much value from such very–low–yield tests as they might be 
able to conceal….The worse–case scenario under a no–CTBT regime poses far bigger threats to US 
security interests––sophisticated nuclear weapons in the hands of many more adversaries––than the 
worst–case scenario of clandestine testing in a CTBT regime, within the constraints posed by the 
monitoring system.  
(3) Nuclear Safety. Only one US nuclear weapon accident has taken place since 1968, which was the 
1980 accident of a liquid–fueled missile. This accident did not spread radioactivity and is now irrelevant 
since all liquid–fueled nuclear missiles have been decommissioned. Only two of the 32 accidents spread 
considerable radioactivity, which were both aircraft accidents. Practically all (29 of 32) nuclear weapon 
accidents were with aircraft, which no longer carry nuclear weapons unless placed on alert. The least safe 
nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery and SRAMs) have been decommissioned and safety procedures have 
been modified for submarine weapons. A 1992 law required that the Defense Department to do a cost–
benefit analysis on safety issues to determine whether new warheads that needed nuclear testing were cost 
effective. Both Republican and Democratic administrations have since testified that new weapons are not 
needed to enhance safety. There are no significant safety problems that require nuclear testing to resolve 
them.  
II. NAS Panel Conclusions on Reliability.  
• The NAS panel determined that, under these conditions, US warheads could remain safe 
and reliable without testing:  
• Maintain a high-quality workforce.  
• Stockpile stewardship and enhanced surveillance must examine components of weapons. 
Based on past experience, the majority of aging problems will be found in the non-
nuclear components, which can be fully tested under a CTBT.  
• The most likely potential source of nuclear-related degradation is the possibility that the 
primary yield falls below a minimum level needed to drive a secondary. NNSA has 
concluded that plutonium pits have a minimum lifetime of 45-60 years [now 100 years] 
with "no life-limiting factors as yet recognized."  
• In the past there were few underground nuclear explosions that explicitly served to check 
the reliability of weapons in the stockpile. Most nuclear tests were used to study and 
certify new designs and to examine weapons effects.  
• Remanufacture to original specifications is the preferred approach for age-related defects, 
with a highly disciplined process to install few changes without changing the basic 
nuclear design.  
The NAS panel continually asked weapon designers during classified briefings on the enduring stockpile 
whether testing was needed to resolve the issue under discussion. NNSA weapon scientists always 
responded that testing was not needed to solve the issue under discussion. The NAS panel concluded the 
following, based on their experience and the briefings: 
Although a properly focused stockpile stewardship program is capable, in our judgment, of maintaining 
the required confidence in the enduring stockpile under a CTBT, we do not believe that it will lead to a 
capability to certify new nuclear subsystem design for entry in the stockpile without nuclear testing -- 
unless by accepting a substantial reduction in the confidence in weapon performance associated with the 
certification up until now, or a return to earlier, simpler, single stage design concepts such as gun-type 
weapons. 
It seems to us that the argument to the contrary – that is, the argument that improvements in the 
capabilities that underpin confidence in the absence of nuclear testing will inevitably lose the race with 
the growing needs from an aging stockpile – underestimates the current capability for stockpile 
stewardship, underestimates the effects of current and likely future rates of progress in improving these 
capabilities, and overestimates the role that nuclear testing ever played (or would be ever likely to play) in 
ensuring stockpile reliability. 
These conclusions are consistent with the fact that the United States has not needed to test in the 15 years 
since the testing moratorium began in 1992. Each year the US government has stated that it is “confident 
that the stockpile is safe and reliable, and there is no requirement at this time for nuclear tests.”[6] The 
annual certification on stockpile readiness requires the Secretary of Defense (after advice from Strategic 
Command and the military services) and the Secretary of Energy (after advice from the three weapon 
laboratory directors and the NNSA Administrator) to determine whether all safety and reliability 
requirements are being met without the need for nuclear testing. These reports have always certified that 
the stockpile does not need testing for reasons of safety or reliability. The NAS panel concluded, with 
these caveats, that testing is not needed in future years: (1) A robust stockpile stewardship program, (2) 
no new weapon designs, and (3) the right of the United States to withdraw from the CTBT if the United 
States decides it must test to defend its national security. 
About $7 billion is spent annually to maintain the enduring stockpile (Table 1) and infrastructure under 
the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) and the Lifetime Extension Program (LEP). Sidney Drell and 
Robert Peurifoy discussed the technical issues involved with a nuclear test ban.[7] The main threat to 
warhead reliability is caused by non-nuclear components, which is usually observable without testing on 
these issues: insufficient tritium, faulty tritium bottles, corrosion of fissile material, degradation of high 
explosive, low–temperature performance, vulnerability to fratricide neutrons, radar, batteries, fuse switch, 
neutron generator, faulty cables, trajectory sensors, control systems, rocket motor, gas transfer valve, 
firing set, and pilot parachute. The warheads in the enduring stockpile have been tested 150–200 times. 
Table 1. US Nuclear Warheads in the Enduring Stockpile (2006). Warhead types that are to be 
partially dismantled are marked with an *. This table does not include the B62 (580 warheads) and W84 
(383 warheads), which are scheduled for full dismantlement. [R.S. Norris and H.M. Kristensen[8]]  
Type Yield Platform Active Inactive Total 
B61/3* 10-350 kt airplane 200 186 386 
B61/4* 10-350 kt airplane 200 204 404 
B61/7 10-350 kt airplane 215 224 439 
B61/11 10-350 kt airplane 20 21 41 
B83  1.2 Mt.  airplane 320 306 626 
W76* 100 kt SLBM 1712 1318 3030 
W78* 335 kt  ICBM 785 20 805 
W80/1* 150 kt ALCM 1450 361 1811 
W87 300 kt  ICBM 0 553 553 
W88 475 kt  SLBM 404 0 404 
TOTAL      5306 3193 8499 
 
Eleven warheads of each type are annually taken to the Pantex facility, disassembled and examined for 
deterioration. The JASON group recommended a variety of measures to increase performance margins of 
warheads, beyond increasing tritium content in the warhead.[9] Warheads will have to be rebuilt; the 
question is how often with 100–year pit lifetimes. The basic science of warheads and their viability are 
examined with the technologies listed below: 
• visual observation for corrosion, deterioration, cracks and other issues  
• chemical, electrical, ultrasonic, diamond-anvil, and other tests  
• functional testing of components  
• X–ray scattering to search for changes  
• deep penetration digital radiography to detect flaws and cracks (core punch)  
• laser scattering to study surface imperfections  
• synchrotron–based spectroscopy and diffraction  
• reassembled device without SNM tested to destruction (Joint Test Assembly)  
• subcritical and hydrodynamic tests (Rebound, Holog, Joint Actinide Shock Physics 
Experimental Research, Atlas pulse power machine, critical assemblies at Device 
Assembly Facility).  
• Dual Axis Radiographic Hydro Test (DAHRT)  
• Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program  
• accelerated aging of pits with shorter–lived plutonium–238  
• National Ignition Facility (not yet functioning)  
   
III. NNSA Definition of Reliability 
The United States has not tested each warhead type enough times to determine reliability with high confidence 
statistics, and certainly not for the effects of aging. Assume ten reliability tests were performed and all were 
successful. The reliability is not 100 percent with 100 percent confidence, but rather there is a 30 percent chance that 
reliability is less than 90 percent and a 10 percent chance that reliability is less than 80 percent.[10] Thus, the 
United States has never known warhead reliability with precision when the warhead entered the stockpile, nor has 
the United States searched sufficiently for aging effects with confidence tests.  
NNSA Definition of Reliability. “The reliability of obtaining the predicted yield of a nuclear weapon has 
never been assessed because there have never been enough performance [nuclear] tests to establish a statistical 
reliability. Thus, when a defect type impacting the nuclear explosive package is discovered, the yield performance is 
evaluated, but no reliability degradation estimate can be made. Therefore, no data is available regarding analysis 
relating to reliability degradation to predicted yields.….In general terms, reliability is defined as the ability of an 
item to perform a required function. Implicit in the above definition of ‘required function’ for one–shot devices, 
such as nuclear weapons, are the required conditions and duration of storage, transportation, and function.”[11] In 
other words, when a few successful tests give the design yield, the reliability of a warhead type is defined as 1.0, but 
without a confidence level. When actionable defects are detected, NNSA analysis reduces reliability of 1.0 by an 
amount R to give a reduced-reliability for each warhead type. NNSA set numerical bounds on reliability reductions 
RΔ for 164 actionable defects in 46 warhead types, mostly in the 39 retired warhead types:[12] ΔR = 0–1% (112 
defect types), RΔ = 1–5% (37), RΔ = 5–10% (6), RΔ > 10% (9).  
The effect on secondary yield of radiant energy transfer from the primary stage is very nonlinear. A drop in primary 
yield by a factor of two, for example, could greatly reduce the secondary yield because critical pressures and 
temperatures may not be obtained. However weapon yield is not a “step function” that varies between two values, 
zero and certified yield. NNSA is concerned about catastrophic failure of an entire type. This is partially driven by 
the fact that yield on target is usually much larger than what is needed for particular missions, so the only issue is 
“does it work.” NNSA does not consider the criteria for nuclear missions in any depth since targeting is left to the 
Strategic Command. Since there are 7 warhead types in the enduring stockpile, a catastrophic failure of one type 
would shift responsibility to the other six types, with time to repair the catastrophic failure.  
IV. Requirements for Reliability and Yield. 
NNSA does not consider nuclear targeting for its annual certification report. Since the accuracy of missiles is a 
statistical phenomenon, statistical analysis is necessary to quantify destruction of targets to determine if warhead 
degradation is relevant or not. The ability to destroy a target depends on (1) the hardness H of the target (minimum 
destruction pressure), (2) the yield Y of the weapon, (3) the accuracy of the weapon (CEP, circular error probable), 
(4) the reliability R of the weapon system (0 to 1), and (5) the number n of warheads attacking a target (taking into 
account fratricide).[13] The single–shot–kill–probability SSKP is the kill probability of a single warhead on a known 
target with perfect reliability of R = 1. We initially assume lethal warheads with SSKP = 1, giving a kill probability 
for one warhead of P1 = R. If n independent warheads from n missiles are used on a target without fratricide, the kill 
probability is Pn = 1 – (1 – R)n. Reliability of R = 0.5 gives P2 = 0.75 and P3 = 0.88, and R = 0.25 gives P2 = 0.44 
and P3 = 0.58. Except for the case of a pre-emptive attack against a large force, additional warheads on a target can 
be used for case of reduced reliability. 
The kill capability of one W88 warhead of 475 kilotons with 100–meter CEP accuracy attacking a 2000–psi hard 
target silo with 0.9 reliability is P1 = 0.898. If the W88 yield is reduced by 50%, P2 = 0.99 and P3 = 0.998, and if 
yield is reduced by 90%, P2 = 0.88 and P3 = 0.96. These results show that large yield reductions do not significantly 
change P2 and P3. 
Testing data obtained from DOE with a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request is discussed below.[14] Some 
warhead types had problems during the early transition to miniaturized warheads with reduced mass and 
volume.[15] The 1958–61 testing moratorium prevented tests at the time these new warheads entered the force. 
Actionable defects, identified by stockpile stewardship and not by nuclear tests, are listed in Table 2; those marked 
with an * needed a retrofit or a major redesign. The last column gives the year of discovery of the defect after the 
first production unit (FPU). Three warheads were retrofitted: (1) B61, 3 years after FPU, (2) W80, 1 year after FPU, 
and W88 at 1, 1, 2, and 3 years after FPU. This and other data suggest that primary/secondary stages do not show 
significant aging problems once they have been in the field for a few years. The average age of discovery for the 6 
retrofits in Table 2 was 1.8 years after FPU. Five retrofit types were for primaries and one was for a secondary. All 
six retrofits were from design flaws, causing yield reduction (in 4 cases), reduced safety (1 case) and non-applicable 
(1 case). The average discovery time for the retired warhead types was 1.9 years after FPU for the 33 primary and 1 
secondary stages. Retrofits were caused by design flaws (33), aging (5) and production (1), which effected safety 
(19), reliability (6), yield reduction (5) and not applicable (4). 
Table 2. Actionable defects for warheads in the enduring stockpile. Those that required a retrofit or 
major design change are marked with an *. This table does not include the 39 retired warhead types. 
Nuclear components are primary (p) and secondary (s) with number of generic events in parentheses. 
Causes are aging (A), design (D), and production (P), without needing the causes of field induced (F), 
unknown (U), and combination of design/production (C). Effects from the causes are safety (S) (nuclear 
detonation safety, nuclear material scatter, or personnel safety), operational yield reduction (O), and not 
applicable (na), and reliability reduction (R, which was not applicable here). [Table 6, FOIA–NNSA]  
primary(p) 
secondary(s) 
(number) 
cause 
A,C,D,P,U
effect 
R,S,O,na FPU: yr after 
B61 p(2) 
s(2) 
D*, P 
P, P 
O*, O 
S, S 
1980-86: 3*, 3  
6,7 
B83 p(0) 
s(0) 
    1983:   
W76 p(2) 
s(1) 
P, P 
P 
na,O 
O 
1979: 1,4 
6 
W78 p(3) 
s(0) 
P, A, D  O, na, S  1980: 3,6,11 
W80 p(2) 
s(2) 
D*, P  O*,O 
na, na 
1981-4: 1*, 1  
1,5 
W87 p(0) 
s(0) 
    1986:   
W88 p(3) 
s(2) 
D*, D*, D*
D*, D 
na*, S*, O*
O*, O 
1988: 1*, 2*, 3* 
1*, 3 
 
Table 2 suggests that primaries are much more vulnerable than secondaries. The two sets of data (retired 
and enduring warheads) show that the average age of discovery is less than two years after the first 
production unit. The full data set gives the main cause of diminished reliability, which results from 
failures of non-nuclear components, not failures of nuclear stages. Drell and Peurifoy quantified warhead 
reliability as follows: “Since the start of the current stockpile evaluation and reliability assessment 
program in 1958, about 13,000 weapon evaluations have been conducted. During this period, the failure 
rate of the nondevice hardware suggests an expected weapon failure rate of 1–2% for the stockpile.”[16] 
Missile failure rates are larger, as pointed out by Richard Feynman, whose estimates were 2% for mature 
solid–fueled missiles and 4% for all solid–fueled missiles.[17] 
These actionable defects for the enduring stockpile were all discovered by stockpile stewardship, except 
for the W80 cruise missile warhead, which revealed a cold temperature detonation problem. DOE was 
asked about the “four Product Change Proposals that required underground tests since 1970.” The FOIA 
response below stated that only 4 tests were used; 2 for enduring stockpile weapons and 2 for now retired 
warheads:[18] 
1. B61/Mod-1 conversion to B61/Mod-7 (Underground testing was used to compare nuclear 
performance of the insensitive, IHE–primary relative to the former HE–primary being 
replaced) – 13 years post B61/Mod-1 FPU.  
2. W68 (Underground testing verified a corrective change replacing the primary HE) – 7 
years post FPU;  
3. W79 (Underground testing confirmed a safety problem) – 7 years post FPU; and  
4. W80 (Underground testing revealed a cold temperature detonation problem) – within 1 
year FPU.  
The FOIA response described Major Product Change Proposals for warheads in the enduring stockpile. 
Six of the 36 proposals affected the primary or secondary and 30 were for non-nuclear components. A 
new pit was incorporated for the B61 in the first year after FPU and high explosive specifications were 
changed 3 years after FPU. Thirteen years after FPU the B61/Mod–1 pit was modified for insensitive high 
explosive for Mod–7, the earth penetrator, which was nuclear tested. The W88 primary and secondary 
was modified during 1–3 years after FPU. The W80 primary was modified one year after FPU for cold–
temperature performance. 
Conclusion. 
The data presented in this paper suggest that US nuclear warheads continue to be reliable, consistent with 
the annual certification by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy. Plutonium aging is no longer a 
significant issue, as shown by natural– and accelerated–aged plutonium samples. It is imperative that the 
missions for nuclear weapons be considered when modernizing and sizing the US nuclear weapons 
stockpile. NNSA is given very high requirements for yield and reliability by the Department of Defense. 
But these very high requirements are only relevant for a pre-emptive attack on Russia (perhaps China in 
the future). The Defense Department maintains these extremely high standards for this type of attack, but 
this policy leads the United States to reject the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, an act which is 
counter–productive to the US goal of reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation. Secrecy and vagueness 
have prevented a relevant discussion on weapon reliability and its impact on the CTBT. The 6 December 
2006 vote on the resolution favoring the CTBT in the UN General Assembly shows that practically all 
nations strongly prefer a completed CTBT, as they fail to understand US views on the reliability of 
nuclear weapons. The vote was 172 in favor to 2 against (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the 
United States), with 4 abstentions (Colombia, India, Mauritius, Syria). The data presented in this paper 
suggest that the 172 votes in favor of the CTBT are well justified by the facts. 
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